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1. Overview 
This book presents a view both of computation in the brain and of how computation 
should be organized in future computer systems. As the book is written by someone 
who is well versed in several fields, including symbolic AI, artificial neural networks, 
neuroscience and control theory, it is well worth paying attention to. Much of the book 
is about matters such as vision, in both its low level and high level aspects, and movement 
control, but it also addresses natural language and, briefly, consciousness. 
Apart from the particular theoretical view it espouses, the book is useful in its detailed 
summaries of some aspects of the mammalian brain, neural systems of lowly animals 
(notably frog, toad and marine slug), control theory, dynamical systems theory, artificial 
neural networks and AI. It is meant to be accessible overall to, say, a typical Scientific 
American reader, but is also intended to be useful for experts in fields such as AI, robotics, 
cognitive science, neural networks and neuroscience. The book is not, and could not be, 
anywhere near encyclopedic on such fields; the emphasis is rather on aspects of those 
fields that serve in some way to illustrate, support or constrain the central theoretical ideas 
of the volume. But one could repudiate the whole of Arbib’s theory and still glean much 
useful information from the book, and indeed much of the information given seems rather 
independent of his theory. The book does skip about a bit from topic to topic, but as it is 
fat and dense that may be a good thing. 
The central ideas of the volume are cooperative computation, coordinated control 
programs, schemas, action-oriented perception, perception-oriented action, and, stepping 
down to the neural level, topological mappings (in the sense that, say, a retinotopic 
representation in brain cortex is topological). In all this, schemas are the primary notion. 
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A schema is somewhat like a process description. Arbib views brain activity as a 
matter of many schema instances operating in parallel and communicating with each 
other. A schema instance is an active instantiation of a schema, and the population of 
instances can change rapidly. Two salient types of schema are perceptual schemas and 
motor schemas. Perceptual schemas are activated by, or look for, particular things in the 
perceived environment. These things might be relatively low level features or they might 
be members of some high-level conceptual category. A perceptual schema instance is not 
only a process but also holds information about the entity it has perceived (so to speak). 
Motor schemas are prescriptions for motor activity, and are a special case of schemas for 
action. 
Arbib typically uses the term “cooperative computation” to mean the interaction of 
schema instances. But he also uses it (at a coarse grain) to describe the interaction of 
brain modules that he does not explicitly classify as schema instances, and (at a fine grain) 
to describe interactions between units in a neural network, where again the units are not 
cast as schema instances. 
In Arbib’s view, action can be perception-oriented in that an action can be aimed 
at facilitating further perception. Moving the eyes or head is a basic example of 
this. Conversely, perception is action-oriented in that perceptual schemas are aimed at 
facilitating specific actions the organism may take. Importantly, however, those actions can 
be internal ones that are aimed at updating or improving the organism’s model of its world, 
rather than being external actions on the environment. The internal model has a short-term 
aspect consisting of schema instances, and a long-term aspect consisting of schemas. 
One way in which the action-oriented quality of perception is important in Arbib’s view 
is that low-level perceptual computation might be enough for various types of action. 
For instance, in order to navigate through some objects it can be enough to know where 
the objects are, not what they are. Relatedly, Arbib presents evidence that the brain has 
various different vision systems, with object locating and object recognizing being done 
by different systems. 
Schema instances can be grouped into schema assemblages, which can themselves be 
instances of higher-level schemas. (One minor problem I had with reading the book was 
the use of the term “schema assemblage” when “schema instance assemblage” would 
have been clearer.) The dynamic formation of such higher-level schemas is one type of 
learning Arbib hints at, although he does not provide a detailed account of how it might 
work. A coordinated control program is a schema whose instances are schema(-instance) 
assemblages, and which is partly like a flowchart and partly like a system chart of the type 
used in control theory. The nodes are schemas that can communicate both by activating 
each other and by continuously passing signals to each other. The amalgamation of control 
theory with the types of interaction covered in the parallel computing sector of computer 
science is one of the more distinctive features of Arbib’s account. 
Arbib occasionally appeals to the Piagetian notions of assimilation and accommodation 
(to and of schemas, respectively). However, it was not clear to me how his schemas 
resemble or differ from the schemas of Piaget, or the similar constructs of other authors 
whose work he reviews. (He does point out that his work differs from that of Neisser and 
Gibson in being more concerned with the detailed mechanisms underlying cognition- 
p. 47.) In particular, although Arbib mentions AI frame-based and script-based research as 
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being part of the same enterprise as his schema theory (p. 47), and briefly points out some 
differences, I would have appreciated a more detailed comparison. Arbib mentions that in 
this book he is not concerned with the “social schemas” he has discussed elsewhere. These 
are patterns of behavior involving several organisms, and are held by the society en masse 
(p. 45). The book confines itself to schemas inside individual organisms. 
A strong methodological theme in the book is that it is important to have tools for 
describing computation at levels higher than that of neural networks, and of course he 
proposes schema theory as an important item in the toolbox. At the same time he is careful 
not to make the simplistic claim that a schema, schema instance, or a component of a 
schema or instance is implemented in the brain as a dedicated neural network. He points out 
that a single region of the brain might subserve many schemas, and a schema (or instance) 
might involve several regions. (I would have preferred less talk of regions as opposed to 
just subsets of the total set of neurons.) In particular, he guards against assuming that, just 
because a neural network exhibits two different behaviors under different conditions, it 
must have a subnetwork set aside for each behavior. He gives a simple example of this 
(p. 11): a small network that can either act as an AND gate or as an OR gate depending on 
the value on one input line, but where there is no division into a module for AND and one 
for OR. 
In this way Arbib is sympathetic to high-level units of behavior emerging in some subtle, 
distributed way from neural networks. This resonates with standard connectionist claims 
that such things as rules can be merely emergent from subsymbolic computation. On the 
other hand, Arbib also says that high-level units such as rules can enable the system to 
avoid a great deal of expensive, highly parallel, low-level processing (p. 247). I found 
this balanced view of Arbib’s appealing, but the claim about high-level rules needs further 
justification, as one might have conjectured that highly parallel, low-level processing is not 
a drain on the overall system in the first place. 
Another interesting claim of Arbib’s on the subject of levels is that the brain develops 
high-level motor schemas and also interpreters for these schemas, one such for many 
different body systems. Various different body systems may therefore be capable of 
interpreting a schema (with a possible degradation in performance) even though they have 
never seen that particular schema before, (p. 251). This idea is useful in accounting, for 
instance, for the fact that you can use a paintbrush tied to a long pole to write your name 
on a wall, in a somewhat individual way. The schema interpretation notion is also used 
in a theory of hand movements couched in terms of “virtual fingers.” A virtual finger 
can be mapped to a subset of the fingers (including the thumb), or even to the palm of 
the hand. High-level schemas are expressed in terms of virtual fingers, leaving context- 
sensitive interpreters to map virtual fingers to particular sets of hand parts. The primary 
example here is the act of picking up a mug, where the particular set of fingers put inside 
the handle depends on various features of the mug. 
Despite Arbib’s emphasis on distributed computation in general and certain types of 
distributed effect in neural networks, some readers may feel that his approach leads to too 
discrete a division of behavior into schemas. For instance, in discussing prey acquisition by 
toads, Arbib proposes (pp. 2 19-222) one perceptual schema for detecting a barrier, one for 
detecting a chasm, and one for detecting the free prey condition (no obstacle, i.e., barrier 
or chasm). But there is no argument that it is indeed appropriate to postulate separate 
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schemas here. Perhaps there is one schema from which different behaviors can emerge (cf. 
the AND/OR example above). Arbib may fact be right in his analysis of prey acquisition 
by toads, but it is not clear that the sort of division he proposes here would hold water for 
other activities of other organisms. 
As Arbib himself points out, he is not presenting a particular formalism for schemas. 
One is left to induce what they are like from the examples he gives-and he does indeed 
give some detailed examples. Arbib rightly points out that in computer science the general 
notion of a program (as opposed to a program in a specific language or theoretical 
framework) is, equally, only vaguely specified; but it is still a useful notion. 
Arbib also freely admits that he does not have an account of how multiple, dynamically 
arising instances of a given schema can be handled in neural circuitry, whether artificial or 
biological (p. 246; see also p. 180). I concur with him that this is a fundamental and crucial 
issue, and I have made brief comments on it elsewhere (Bamden [4]). As Arbib says, one 
central technical issue is the problem of how inferential and other mechanisms respond to 
recruited, and therefore in someone sense unpredictable, assemblies of neurons. (This is on 
the presumption that a schema instance is realized as a recruited assembly, though that is 
not the only possibility). Actually, the more fully worked out applications of schema theory 
do not involve multiple instantiation-for example, the perceptual schema for barriers in 
toads is its own unique and permanently existing instance. But multiple instantiation is 
multiply appealed to elsewhere in the book. 
Schema theory is, overall, rather speculative, though in places backed up by experimen- 
tal data or by plausible connections with neurophysiology. Much of the book does not 
provide (and does not appear to be aimed at providing) evidence that his theory is correct, 
and instead supplies interesting constraints or boundary conditions on what a correct, fully 
developed schema theory would be like. For instance, the detailed discussion of the dynam- 
ics and feedback control of muscles makes little direct contact with schema theory (though 
clarifying what motor schemas need to do in order to control muscles), and the same is true 
of the overviews of artificial neural net frameworks. The detailed accounts of some aspects 
of human brain circuitry are at best suggestive of how schemas might be neurally real- 
ized. But all this is not surprising or reprehensible, and as Arbib points out, speculations 
about how schemas could be realized in neural networks, or about what brain networks 
they might involve, can prompt useful experiment and can lead to new developments in 
neural net research (p. 207). 
The book’s title alludes to metaphor. This is for two reasons. First, Arbib views any 
scientific theory as a metaphor for its target, and views his schema theory in particular as a 
metaphor for the brain. As part of this, he alludes to the metaphor of the brain as computer 
(but not as a traditional serial one). In a sense Arbib inverts the brain-as-computer metaphor 
in suggesting in the final chapter that future computers will compute in the style of the 
brain as construed through schema theory. Some of his specific suggestions on this topic 
are summarized below. The second reason for the title is that he casts the brain’s schemas 
as metaphorical constructions of chunks of reality. In addition, Arbib mentions his view 
that language is inherently metaphorical (endnote 7 in Chapter 5). 
Finally, the book is a radical revision of his earlier book with a similar title (Arbib [ 11). 
Some technical concepts have been renamed and elaborated-in particular, the so-called 
slide-box metaphor of the 1972 book is superseded while still having some usefulness 
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(pp. 32-34). Also, much extra material has been added. The present book does not rely on 
familiarity with the earlier one. 
The following section discusses Arbib’s schemas further. The section after that briefly 
outlines what Arbib covers in various areas: AI, sixth-generation computing systems, high- 
level cognition (especially language), consciousness, and neural networks. (The extensive 
material on the structure and wiring of the brain and related organs is not systematically 
outlined here.) The final section is a summary of the review. 
2. Some issues concerning schemas 
Arbib’s schema theory would, I imagine, be appealing to many people in AI, particularly 
as Arbib gives a detailed account of how the knowledge-based VISIONS system for 
computer vision illustrates the theory, and also discusses in more general terms how 
blackboard systems such as HEARSAY II relate to the theory. Also, Arbib presents 
some schema-theoretic work on manipulator control in robotics, and summarizes schema- 
theoretic accounts of various aspects of natural language (see below). And, schema theory 
is in tune with the current emphasis on parallel and distributed computing. 
However, some aspects of At-bib’s account are not entirely convincing. Arbib suggests 
that in applying schema theory to understanding images of complex scenes, different 
schema instances would be brought into being by a given portion of the image, and they 
would compete with each other to provide an explanation of that portion. For example, 
one part of the image might stimulate the creation of both an instance of a tree-foliage 
schema and an instance of a blob-of-ice-cream schema; similarly, an adjacent portion 
might stimulate instances of a tree-trunk schema and an ice-cream-cone schema. (See 
pp. 37-39 and the discussion of the VISIONS system.) The ice-cream and foliage instances 
would compete with each other, while the foliage instance would cooperate with the trunk 
instance, and so on. This type of suggestion is natural and quite common, especially in 
connectionist circles. However, one needs to get to grips with what would happen to the 
proposal if it were scaled up to reality. The sort of image region that could suggest either 
ice-cream or foliage would, in a full cognitive system, equally suggest a myriad other 
categories (a fluff of cotton, a cloud in the sky, an cloud of car exhaust, a blob of mashed 
potato, a hairdo, a smudge on a window-pane, etc. etc.) One would therefore have to 
have a competition/cooperation scheme that would be able rapidly to deal with very large 
numbers of schema instances. While it is conceivable that existing computational schemes 
for competition/cooperation (e.g., in neural networks) could handle cases of realistic size, 
this needs to be demonstrated. To be fair, Arbib does essentially point this problem out 
(p. 264) in discussing the VISIONS system. 
I felt there should have been some consideration of the possibility that overall collections 
of low level image features somehow stimulate schema instances characterizing the whole 
image (or large parts of it), without first stimulating schema instances for smaller parts of 
it; and those large-scale schema instances then suggest schemas for smaller parts. I am not 
claiming that this proposal has a better future than Arbib’s own, but only that a wider range 
of possibilities needs to be considered. 
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The book consistently views multiple instances of a given schema as individually 
active entities-simultaneously and independently running “invocations” [my term] of 
the schema, which is merely their “program.” However, readers should be aware that at 
a recent workshop on schema theory (Arbib et al. [2]), Arbib voiced the possibility that in 
many case it might be better to propose that instances are merely repositories of particular 
parameter settings for the schema, and not simultaneously active; in this view, the schema 
would be the only thing that would be active, and at any time would use the parameter 
settings provided by some single instance. (See footnote 3 in Arbib’s Introduction in At-bib 
et al. [2], and also another paper by Arbib in the same proceedings.) This would seem to 
be a major shift of viewpoint, but the general consequences for schema theory remain to 
be spelled out. 
At one point Arbib is not entirely true to his own precepts on action-oriented perception. 
In describing the VISIONS system as one that conforms to his schema theory, Arbib 
discusses the fact that the system failed to see a mailbox in the input scene, and also failed 
to identify a white patch behind a tree as part of the wall of a house it had identified 
(p. 244). Arbib discusses modifications to the system that would allow it to spontaneously 
notice these things. However, I had not in fact noticed the mailbox in the picture, or realized 
that the white patch was part of the house! This was so even despite my close examination 
of the picture while reading the previous text. I only perceived the mailbox and patch for 
what they were in executing the action of reading Arbib’s discussion of them. 
Finally, one particular expansion of Arbib’s view of schema-instance interaction may 
be appropriate. Arbib gives the impression much of the time that instances interact with 
each other by rather simple signals or messages. As a major exception, in the VISIONS 
system the instances interact by setting up goals and hypotheses visible to the system at 
large. Clearly, for high-level cognitive in general it is appropriate to imagine schemas 
communicating by means of rather complex messages. It would seem to me fruitful to 
cast complex messages themselves as schema instances. For example, the just-mentioned 
goals and hypotheses could be schema instances. 
3. Outlines of area coverage 
On artiJcia1 intelligence, Arbib spends most of his time discussing vision systems, 
particularly the knowledge-based VISIONS system. There is some detail on methods for 
determining the depth of objects away from a vision system, including but not limited 
to stereopsis, and of the determination of optic flow. Arbib casts doubt on the need 
for, or realistic feasibility of, the 2$-D sketches of Marr (p. 224f, 363). Arbib intends 
schema theory in general, and particular tools for hand control such as virtual fingers 
and opposition spaces, to provide a framework for robotics. However, there is not much 
discussion of robotics as such, although he does briefly describe a schema-based path- 
planning system, AURA, and a neural network landmark-learning system (see below). 
(For more work on application of schema control to robotics, see the above-referenced 
workshop proceedings.) Planning of actions is often mentioned in the book, though no 
detailed planning scheme is set out. The virtual-finger mechanism amounts to a specialized 
type of planning, and is described in a relatively detailed way. The HEARSAY II 
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speech-understanding system is overviewed, as it has some kinship with schema-theory 
(particularly because VISIONS is reminiscent of HEARSAY II). 
Late in the book (p. 392) Arbib throws out a large claim merely in passing. He says that 
“ . . . schemas . . . determine a course of action by a process of analogy formation, planning, 
and schema interaction, which need have little in common with formal deduction.” 
(Readers should realize that it is schema instances that are really meant here, not schemas 
as such.) My focus here is on the mention of analogy. No other mention of it occurs in the 
book, except implicitly through the rather general comments on metaphor (as summarized 
above) and Piagetian assimilation. I believe that analogical processing as a replacement for 
more rigid deductive reasoning is an important and fruitful idea, one that could usefully 
have received extensive and detailed discussion in the book. 
Arbib outlines three schema-theoretic models in the realm of natural language: a 
lesionable cooperative computation model of sentence comprehension (developed by H.M. 
Gigley); a model of language acquisition in the two-year-old (developed by J.C. Hill); 
and a model using salience in deep generation of natural language descriptions of visual 
scenes (developed by E.J. Conklin). These models are described in much greater detail in 
Arbib, Conklin & Hill [3]. (Only the first of the models is anywhere near a neural net level 
of description.) In discussing language acquisition, Arbib repudiates the notion of innate 
lexical classes or universal grammar. Instead, he seeks to account for acquisition partly 
by appealing to children’s goal to communicate and their liking for repeating utterances 
back. Words that are used in similar ways come to be assigned to the same class, and the 
model assumes innate schemas for usage-based classification. There are also some other 
innate schemas. Arbib says that learning the grammar of a language is a very small part 
of learning the language-the child must also master the idiosyncratic morphophonology 
of the language, the subtle meanings and interrelations of a huge vocabulary, and a large 
stock of idioms, phrases and metaphors. 
Arbib’s general view of language is summed up in an endnote (p. 412): “...meaning is 
extracted from a virtually endless dynamic process. A sequence of words is always an 
impoverished representation of some schema assemblage. A sentence may have a literal 
meaning in terms of skimming off the most common set of associations from the related 
schemas, but there is no dividing line that sets off the literal from the metaphorical. In 
all cases, the schema or discourse provides an entry into a schema network.” Also, Arbib 
sees language as being rooted in sensorimotor processes (p. 264), and claims (p. 181) that 
the overall similarities between sensorimotor and language computations are such that we 
should be able to find clues to language mechanisms by studying sensorimotor activity. 
Arbib briefly describes a preliminary schema-based theory of consciousness, drawing in 
part on the evolutionary ideas of Hughlings Jackson. To communicate, an organism must 
be able to form a summary abstracted from internal neural complexities. Such summaries 
evolved to become a basis not only for external communication but also for internal 
planning and coordination. It is the activity of this co-evolved process that constitutes 
consciousness. Arbib also views communication as just a natural progression from body 
control: “there is a continuity from controlling one’s own body, to using tools, to using 
another member of one’s group to complete some action. As far as the brain is concerned, 
there is no self that stops at the end of the fingers.” (p. 392.) 
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Arbib is sympathetic to the use of imagery as a tool in inference (pp. 226-229). While 
he devotes most of his discussion to the Shepard and Metzler experiments on imagined 3D 
object rotation and reflection, I was more interested in the suggestion that a system could 
answer the query “Is President Bush a man” by accessing an image of him and applying a 
pattern-recognition routine to it. (Arbib merely uses this as a simple, suggestive example 
of a general style of reasoning-he is not seriously suggesting that this particular query 
should be so answered.) Other researchers have made similar suggestions, both within AI 
and without, but it has yet to become a central proposal within AI. 
At the end of the book, Arbib devotes some time to presenting his view of sixth- 
generation computing systems, whether for AI or not. He foresees systems that are richly 
embedded in their environments, blur the distinction between computers and robots, can 
communicate with users through graphical means, are capable of learning, may have neural 
networks as subcomponents, and are organized overall as a collection of cooperating 
agents. Much of this is, of course, in tune with current work on distributed computer 
systems, interfaces, and so forth. He sees programming as still being important, but not 
so much in the present-day sense as in the sense of defining the task specifications of small 
agents, which would then learn to do the tasks. 
Arbib provides descriptions of various well-known types of neural net, notably: 
perceptrons; an associative network of Barto and Sutton for learning how to navigate 
with respect to some landmarks; Amari & Arbib winner-take-all networks; Hopfield nets; 
Boltzmann machines; and back-propagation nets. The inclusion of a detailed mathematical 
presentation of a winner-take-all network was welcome, because mechanisms for winner- 
take-all are given short shrift in some introductory texts on neural networks. On the 
other hand, I noted the lack of references to other methods for achieving winner-take-all 
behavior. I was also surprised that there was no description of Grossberg’s ART systems 
(based on Adaptive Resonance Theory), as it seems relevant to a discussion of model 
matching (p. 375). And, despite Arbib’s emphasis on topological maps in the brain, there 
was no description of systems for automatic learning of topological maps, but only a 
reference to the relevant works by Kohonen and Arbib. 
Arbib is somewhat sceptical of the promise of existing neural network learning methods 
to provide an account of human learning as a whole (p. 373-375,389, 391). He feels that 
declarative memory is not well served, and that domain-specific learning techniques will 
be needed. 
The book provides a lot of interesting detail about neural networks in and overall 
organization of the central nervous systems of humans, other mammals, toads, frogs and 
marine slugs (Aplysia). There is useful discussion of oscillatory circuits, muscle-control 
circuitry, and gaze-control circuitry (including the role of retinotopic maps). There is a 
great deal of detail on the interconnectivity and possible roles of the many visual, motor 
and oculomotor regions of the mammalian brain. He speculates usefully on the brain 
regions that could substantiate his virtual-finger theory, although he does not suggest 
circuitry that could dynamically assign virtual-fingers to real hand-parts. He provides 
a useful caveat about the interpretation of Lashley’s experiments on maze learning by 
rats, often quoted as showing a high degree of distributedness of function in the brain 
(cf. Lashley’s laws of mass action and equipotentiality). Arbib mentions a repetition of 
Lashley’s experiments, in which, instead of lesion-induced impairment of maze-learning 
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performance being measured by one overall parameter, impairment was differentiated into 
several types. For example, some lesioned rats had a tendency to turn left, others to still, 
others to be easily distractable. Thus, it seems that specific types of lesion cause specific 
types of impairment. 
4. Summary 
The book is thought-provoking and informative, wide in scope while also being 
technically detailed, and still relevant to modem AI even though it was published in 1989. 
This relevance lies mainly in the book’s advocacy of distributed computation at multiple 
levels of description, its combining of neural networks and other techniques, its emphasis 
on the interplay between action and perception, and its particular approach to natural 
language processing. The criticisms I have occasionally made above are relatively minor, 
and one of the major shortcomings of schema theory at least at the time of the book’s 
publication-namely the lack of a detailed, preferably neural, mechanism for schema 
instantiation-is one of which Arbib is well aware. The book is well produced, for the 
most part clearly written, and has useful summaries at the beginning of each chapter. Both 
general readers and AI researchers (mainly but not exclusively those working on robotics, 
vision and neural networks) could benefit from reading the book. 
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